Sen. Kaufman brings a dose of reality to the financial reform debate:
What walls will this bill erect? None. On what bedrock does this bill rest if the nation is to hope for another 60 years of financial stability? Better and smarter regulators, plain and simple. No great statutory walls, no hard divisions or limits on regulatory discretion, only a reshuffled set of regulatory powers that already exist. Remember, it was the regulators who abdicated their responsibilities and helped cause the crisis.
Thus far, on the central aspect of “too big to fail,” financial reform consists of giving regulators the authority to supervise institutions that are too big, and then the ability to resolve those banks when they are about to fail. Upon closer examination, however, the former is virtually the same authority regulators currently possess, while the latter – an orderly resolution of a failing mega-bank – is an illusion. Unless Congress breaks up the mega-banks that are “too big to fail,” the American taxpayer will remain the ultimate guarantor in an almost certain-to-repeat-itself cycle of boom-bust-and-bailout.
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It is true that under the current Senate bill, regulators could potentially invoke the Volcker Rule, which would prohibit commercial banks from owning or sponsoring “hedge funds, private equity funds, and purely proprietary trading in securities, derivatives or commodity markets.” I applaud former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker for his critical leadership on these issues, which the Administration has endorsed. Unfortunately, the legislation now being considered by the Senate requires the council first to study the Volcker Rule before deciding whether to enforce it. In the end, it could issue a recommendation not to enforce the Volcker Rule at all. Or the council might recommend simply that regulators mandate capital requirements that are adequate for any risky proprietary activities a particular bank might undertake, a power regulators already have.
The reality is that regulators have long had the authority to prohibit speculative activities at banks, but never opted to do so. Under the Bank Holding Company Act, the Federal Reserve may require a bank holding company to terminate an activity or control of a non-bank subsidiary (such as a broker-dealer or an insurance company) if that activity or subsidiary poses serious risk to the safety, soundness or stability of the holding company.
As we all know too well, in the past, these very same bank regulators failed utterly. Indeed, as the “umbrella regulator” for all bank holding companies, the Federal Reserve could have increased capital and other requirements for these institutions, but instead farmed out this function to credit rating agencies and the banks themselves.